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FOREWORD
\
"_,This document constitutes Volume 4 of a seven-volume Final
Report_prepared by Teledyne Brown Engineering, Huntsville, Alabama,
under NASA CoW'tract No. NAS10-8676, Launch Site Processing of
Hazardous Payloads.:_This study required a thorough analysis of the
impact on the launch site and its operations by hazardous Space Shuttle
payloads.-_
k
Tl_e seven volumes of the Final Report are as follows:
Voldme 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: This volume presents
a concise revie_w of the results of the study tasks and summarizes the
principal conclu_sions and recommendations of the study.
"b
Volume 2. HAZARDOUS PAYLOADS SURVEY AND ANALYSIS:
This volume presents the results of a survey and analysis of proposed
Shuttle payloads to identify hazardous payloads and define the character-
istics of materials and• systems which make them hazardous. This task
included the development of a hazardous payloads ranking technique
%
and recommendations_for processing analysis on selected payloads.
Volume 3. NORMAL PROCESSING ANALYSIS: This volume
presents preliminary noi'mal_ processing flow plans for three Shuttle
cargoes selected as a res_ult of the Hazardous Payloads Survey and
Analysis Task. These thr_e cargoes are:
\
• Spacelab withNAdvanced Technology Laboratory
• Tug, Solar Elect_',ic Propulsion Stage, and Synchronous
Earth ObservatoryXSatellite" _\
• Interim Upper Stage and"a. Pioneer Jupiter Probe with
a Fluorine Propulsion Unit"_--
The preliminary processing flow plans include identification
of unique facilities and GSE, processing hazards, and payload safety
related design criteria. >-.
Volume 4. CONTINGENCY PROCESSING ANALYSIS: _'This
volume presents preliminary alternate processing flow plans for
contingency situations for the three Shuttle cargoes analyzed in the
Normal Processing Analysis Task. Z_=-:- :
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Volume 5. CURRENT PAYLOADS SURVEY AND ANALYSIS:
This volume presents the results of a survey and analysis to determine
payloads that are currently flying and that may also fly on the Shuttle
vehicle when it becomes operational. The analysis determines hazard-
ous materials/systems for each of these current payloads and recom-
mends design and operational safety criteria for each hazardous current
payload to minimize its impact on the Shuttle Transportation System.
Volume 6. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
POTENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: This volume presents the results of an
evaluation of the probable environmental impact of Shuttle payloads
hazardous materials and includes recommended KSC Environmental
Impact Statement Potential Requirements.
Volume 7. ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS:
Thi _ volume presents a list of special problems identified in the study
whic cequire advanced technology study or technology development.
iii
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Payloads containing hazardous materials associated with
space vehicle launch operations have been recognized and dealt with on
previous R&D space programs. However, when compared to the Shuttle
Program, these R&D space programs involved relatively few launches
with considerable time between launches. The Shuttle operational pro-
gram will have a high launch rate and in many cases individual launches
will have several independent payloads for accomplishment of separate
missions. Some of these payloads by intent will be recoverable for pur-
pose of reuse, and all must be recoverable in the sense that possible
abort situations prior to deployment have to be recognized.
Present processing schedules have been derived assuming
nominal passive payloads and nominal payload flow time. A number of
specifically safety oriented studies on Shuttle payloads has been per-
formed in recent years. However, relatively few of these have treated
ground operations in depth, and the overall impact of Shuttle payload
hazards on launch and landing site processing and procedures has not
been documented. In order to fill this gap, this 10-month study was
initiated in July 1974. The overall study objectives were to uncover and
determine the hazard potential of Shuttle payloads, develop safety
oriented normal and contingency launch site processing plans for selected
cargoes that will minimize the impact on cost and schedules, and pro-
vide for environmental protection.
1.1 TASK OBJECTIVES
The objective of contingency analysis is to derive a set of alter-
native plans for emergency situations that can arise during the proc-
essing of hazardous payloads.
1.2 SCOPE
Since a contingency is any deviation in the set of conditions from
which the normal base line processing was planned, there are many
types of contingency situations ranging from schedule problems, failures
or malfunctions and human errors, to accidents occurring during the
processing operations. All of these types of contingencies need alter-
native plans if a return to normal or near normal operation is to be
obtained or if a safe and effective backout with minimum damage to facilities
and equipment, minimum injury, and minimum loss of time are to he expected.
"_"TELEDYNE
BROWN ENGINEERING
In this study, the approach has been to analyze two categories
of contingencies that involve cargoes:
Contingencies not directly related to payload/cargo but occur
while the cargo is Orbiter constrained.
Contingencies directly related to payload/cargo and initiated
by the occurrence of payload /cargo processing accidents.
In the first category,the concentration has been on the analysis of
certain contingency situations that have wide and diverse applications
and cover, in a general sense, most of the Orbiter constrained contin-
gency conditions. Table I lists six types of contingencies (i.e., from
the first category) versus the three cargoes.
TABLE I. CONTINGENCIES VERSUS CARGOES
TYPE OF CONTINGENCY
1. BACKOUT OPERATIONS
2. VERTICAL CHANGEOUT
3. MISSION ABORT
4. NORMAL LANDING AT
SITE
5. CRASH I SHOCK CONDITION
AT KSC
6. CRASH ISHOCK CON01TION
AT ALTERNATE SITE
AT THE PAD
CONTI NGENCY
LAND ING
LANDING
CARGO
SPACELABIATL TUGISEPSISEOS IUS/F2PUIPJP
• • •
• • •
In addition to developing the 15 contingency plans shown above, one
accident-type contingency, loss of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
(RTG) cooling was selected from the list of accident candidates, and a plan
for loss of RTG cooling was developed.
For each of the 16 contingencies analyzed in this study, the
following is being provided:
2
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An alternative flow plan for proceeding with near normal
operations or for backing out with minimum loss.
A waterfall/time line chart of the alternative flow for
estimating schedule impact.
• A summary of special safing requirements.
• An identification of special support equipment.
1.3 TASK APPROACH
The approach for developing the contingency package is:
Define the Objective, e.g., safe the cargo, backout from
online operations, and demate as rapidly as possible.
Identify safest and least time consuming operational
sequence (an iterative processl.
--Define a workable operational flow to satisfy the
objective.
--Remove hazardous operations or, where possible,
change the sequence to a less hazardous flow.
--Identify parallel activitie s.
Identify special support equipment requirements, facility
protection, and personnel safety requirements.
1.4 SUMMAR Y OF RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Normal feasible processing plans for the cargoes consisting of
Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM, Interim Upper Stage (IUS)/Fluorine Propulsion
Unit (F2PU)/Pioneer Jupiter Probe (PJP), Tug/Solar Electric Propulsion
Stage (SEPS)/Synchronous E_frth Observatory Satellite (SEOS) were
optimized through a series of iterative tradeoffs. These final iterations
formed the normal base line processing flow plans. They were analyzed
for weaknesses and susceptibility to hazards. Areas revealed to be
particularly vulnerable to catastrophic and critical accidents were flagged
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for further consideration as candidates for contingency planning. Also,
an examination of the normal base line processing flow for the areas of
highest accident potential because of heavy hazard concentrations or
caused by other considerations, such as the cargoes' being Orbiter
constrained, indicated the need for contingency planning for pad backout
operations, vertical changeout options at the pad, and mission abort
plans. The base line processing flow covered landing and refurbishment
operations for the Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM and Tug/SEImS/SEOS. In this
task, normal landing at a contingency site as well as crash/shock
condition landings at both KSC and at a contingency site were studied.
Thus, a set of six general types of contingency plans was developed for
these two cargoes. For the IUS/FzPU/PJP , contingency planning for
landing operations was not studied. A total of 15 general contingency
plans was developed.
From the list of candidate accident contingencies, one accident-
type contingency (loss of RTG cooling for the PJP on the IUS/F2PU/lmJP
cargo) was selected for analysis. In addition to providing the contingency
plans in flow chart form, the operations were timelined and a waterfall
chart was derived for determining schedule impact on the normal
processing operations. From an analysis of each contingency plan,
essential facility modifications and special support equipment required
for the successful deployment of that plan have been compiled and
described.
The primary findings, conclusions, and recommendations
resulting from the contingency analysis are as follows:
• Fluorine
--The consequences of a major fluorine leak at landing
during mission abort of the IUS/F2PU/PJP cargo
make it desireable that F 2 be dumped in space.
--Mission abort and _n-flight dump require a special F 2
vent and dump line. The Orbiter oxidizer dump system
could be used (other oxidizers are primarily LO 2 and
N204). This requires that the Orbiter oxidizer over-
board vent systems' design and materials be F 2
compatible.
4
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--Purge tanks should be provided for F 2 tank purge and
inerting following in-flight dumping during abort. This
is to remove residuals before landing.
--For mission abort of IUS/F2PU/PJP when F 2 is dumped
in-flight, it is recommended that final inerting of F 2
system be conducted at the landing strip or an intermediate
facility before return to the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF).
This requires a heated GN 2 supply, a portable F 2 vent line
system, and a disposal unit.
--(Alternate) if F 2 is not vented in-flight when the mission
is aborted and the system remains intact through landing, it
is recommended that the fluorinated propulsion unit be removed
at the OPF and transferred to the F 2 facility for unloading.
This requires a portable LN 2 cooling supply at the landing
strip.
--Fluorine unit should be removed intact during pad backout
or vertical changeout contingency unless a faiIure has
occurred in the fluorine system,
--Payload Changeout Room (PCR) should have provisions for
bringing LN 2 supply dewar to F2PU level.
--Fluorine drain and disposal unit is required at the pad.
Mercury
--Because of the consequence to the Orbiter from a major
mercury leak at landing {contamination), it is recommended
that mercury propellant be dumped before return in a
mission abort situation.
--Mercury dump for abort could be through the Orbiter
propellant vent system, The Mercury propellant vent
line size should be studied.
--If mercury dumping is not performed for mission abort,
the bladder must be pressurized during landing. The SEPS
structure should be evaluated for 3000-1b shift of mercury.
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--Mercury should not be removed from the SEPS for pad
backout or vertical changeout contingencies.
--All Mercury transfer should be performed at the Mercury
facility.
Radiological (RTG' s)
--RTG's will require a portable cooling unit at the landing
strip for the mission abort contingency.
--Cooling system (onboard) should be designed for complete
redundancy. It is suggested that the coolant shrouds have
alternate coils supplied by separate systems.
--The RTG water cooling system integrity must be leak
proof, i.e., considered the same as a hazardous fluid.
--The RTG water cooling should have relief valve and the
cooling shroud and RTG unit should have a temperature monitor.
--Design of the RTG/Radioisotope Heater Unit (RHU) should be
such that integrity of the units would be maintained in the
event of a fire or explosion.
--Requires presence of trained and equipped radiological
survey/decontamination teams.
6
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2.0 CONTINGENCYSELECTION
Contingency selection is a logical process of analytically search-
ing the normal base line processing flow for the most likely and cata-
strophic contingencies, examining possible alternative courses of action,
and selecting the overall most desirable alternative from the candidates
for implementation.
This process is illustrated in Figure i. The first step in the
contingency selection process is the identification of potential contingency
situations. One of the main thrusts of this study has been the perform-
ance of a hazard analysis on the base line processing flow for the three
cargoes. The hazard analysis has provided in-depth visibility for identi-
fying potential contingency situations through recognition of hazardous
operations, processes, materials, and systems. Since the hazard
analysis covered the entire spectrum of ground processing operations
and categorized hazards according to severity of impact, accident-type
candidate contingency situations could be derived for various operations
or events. In addition to using the hazard analysis as a vehicle for
locating specific contingency situations, six general contingency situa-
tions in which wide spread interest has been shown were selected and
developed. These contingencies shown in Paragraph 1.2 are not directly
related to payload/cargo but occur while the cargo is Orbiter constrained.
Once a potential contingency has been identified (step one) and a
need for an alternative flow has been decided upon, possible alternative
courses of action must be examined (step two). For example, the con-
tingency situation will be bumped against basic types of alternatives--
workarounds, repair/replace and proceed, and changeout payload. For
each feasible course of action, a rough estimate of its overall impact
(step three) is made to assist in selecting the most desirable alternative
(Step 4).
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The development of the normal processing base line flow was an ,
iterative process of continually improving a workable processing plan
until the best overall compromises in safety, schedule time, and
facilities/equipment had been achieved. Through this feedback process,
some hazardous operations were either eliminated, reduced, or re-
placed by less hazardous ones, or the sequence and/or locations
changed so as to have a lesser impact. In essence, tradeoffs consider-
ing the above parameters of safety, time, and facilities were made in
arriving at an intuitive optimum base line flow. This process is typified
in Figure Z,which illustrates by a simple example the replacement of a
section of the normal processing base line with an alternative method.
The implication is that the analysis of the normal base line revealed a
hazardous sequence of operations that can be replaced entirely by an
alternative sequence that will then become an integral part of the optimum
normal processing base line flow.
The detailed hazard analysis was performed on the optimum
normal processing base line flow. The critical and catastrophic hazards
uncovered as a result of this analysis were treated through recom-
mendations designed to control them, or in lieu of appropriate or suit-
able recommendations an alternative flow for an accident-type contingency
was proposed. This type of alternative is not to be mistaken for the
previously discussed type of alternative that replaces another more
hazardous sequence of operations in the iterative process of optimizing
the normal base line processing flow. The alternative for a contingency
situation is not an integral part of the normal base line processing flow
but an alternative path to be used in the event that the undesired con-
tingency occurs.
The alternative flows for contingencies of the three cargoes
(i.e., Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM, Tug/SEPS/SEOS, and IUS/F2PU/PJP)are
discussed in Paragraphs 3. i, 3. 2, and 3. 3. A brief narrative descrip-
tion of each contingency alternative is presented with a discussion of
the operational flows, time lines, and summary of safing requirements.
Constraints and areas of major design impact are also noted. It should
be emphasized that these contingency flows, time lines, and safing
requirements have been developed for the purpose of providing the
safest method of return to a normal or near-normal condition. Depending
upon the initiator of a contingency situation, some of the desired safety
precautions and constraints may have to be omitted if a catastrophic
situation is imminent. This would require for each situation that a
comparison be made of the relative risk from proceeding on a contingency
plan in a less safe manner versus the risk of an imminent catastrophic
condition.
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3.0 CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS
3.1 SPACELAB/ATL/IRTCM CARGO CONTINGENCY PLANS
3. I. 1 Vertical Chanseout at the Pad
This alternative is for those situations where the decision is
to remove the Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM cargo at the pad and to replace it with
another cargo. This is a general-type contingency situation and the
specific cause or reason for the decision to change out is not defined.
If the reason were because of an accident, a failure, etc. , the specific
reason would have to be addressed and the peculiarities of the cause
would have to be treated. This alternative plan requires two canisters:
one that contains the Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM cargo and one on standby that con-
tains an optional cargo. The problem of having a payload changeout
room capable of handling two cargoes simultaneously was not addressed
in this alternative because it will be presented in the flows of the IUS/
FzPU/PJP cargo.
3. I. I. I Time Line
The vertical changeout from initiation of the contingency to
launch of the new cargo is approximately 75 hr. The operations required
to remove the Spacelab and the sequence ;_re shown on Figures 3 and 4.
A nominal time line and sequence of operations for installation of another
payload in the Orbiter are shown. Since there are no provisions for
installation of a Spacelab cargo in the Orbiter in the vertical position,
installation steps for the new cargo are at a level to be applicable to
any payload.
3. 1. 1. Z Sating Requirements
Depending upon the point in the Shuttle countdown where the
vertical changeout contingency operation is initiated, the sating require-
ments that must be completed to ensure safety of operations personnel
and protection of facilities and the payload are as follows:
The Shuttle must be deserviced and safed and the pad
reopened.
Spacelab GOz/GN 2 pressure bottles should be vented
to remove the high pressure hazard. The current ESRO
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Spacelab design provides a nonpropulsive vent on the
forward bulkhead of the Spacelab that dumps into the
cargo bay. Venting of N Z should present no special
problems. However, venting of O 2 or O2/N Z together
may increase chances of a fire hazard in the cargo bay.
Either the O2/N 2 vent line should be connected to the
Orbiter vent system or O 2 venting must be accompanied
by a high flow rate air or N 2 cargo bay purge.
Disconnect all pyrotechnics and install shorting plugs.
This safing requirement will have a significant impact
on the Spacelab design and require access in the vertical
position from the cargo bay if done at the pad. This
would also require special access platforms/mechanisms
such as is shown in paragraph 3.5, Item C-1.
An alternate to pyrotechnics safing at the pad would be
to perform this function upon arrival at the OPF as is
done in the normal post flight operational sequence.
This approach exposes the operational personnel to a
hazard from inadvertent actuation of the boom jettison
systems since access will be required to manually dis-
connect the utility bridge and disconnect the tunnel, if
this approach is required because of access limitations,
mechanical safe and arm devices should be included in
the design of all pyrotechnics or mechanical release
devices should be used rather than pyrotechnics.
Removal of the Spacelab requires separation of the Freon
Thermal Control System (TCS) loop that interconnects the
Spacelab ECS system and the Orbiter radiator. Drain,
flush, and purge of these lines are not considered necessary
for safing prior to Spacelab removal but present a
contamination problem. It is recommended that the
Freon system be designed so that a disconnection when
charged is possible with minimal leakage.
3. I. Z Backout Operations
The backout contingency like the changeout contingency is a
general flow that is applicable to any Spacela b cargo. Because it is
general, specific reasons (such as a particular type of accident being
14
@_TELEDYNE
BROWN ENGINEERING
the initiating cause of the backout) are not addressed in this flow.
The assumption is that the cause is controllable or has been arrested,
thus presenting no special or unique fix at the pad.
3. i. 2..1 Time Line
The backout operation from initiation of backout to arrival
at the O&C Building with the removed payload is approximately 35 hr.
The operations required to perform the Spacelab removal and
their sequence are shown in Figures 5 and 6.
3. I. 2. 2 Safing Requirements
The sating requirements for this contingency are identical to
the Spacelab vertical changeout operations given in paragraph 3. 1. 1.2.
3. i. 3 Mission Abort
This contingency requires in-flight sating of the Orbiter and
cargo. Our primary concern, however, is with the cargo. Since the
abort can take place at various points within the mission, cargo related
safing must be examined in light of the worst case assumption that
various experiments could be in process and thus must be dealt with
accordingly.
3. I. 3. 1 Time Line
The mission abort contingency flow is shown in Figure 7. The
time required to safe the cargo for abort depends upon the operations in
progress and time into the mission. Because of the number of possible com-
binations of operation,a time frame is impractical to determine.
3. I.3. 2 Safin8 Requirements
The following safing operations must be performed for a
mission abort and return to a normal landing.
@ All booms and antennae that are deployed at the time of
the abort decision must be retracted or jettisoned if
unable to retract because of a mechanical malfunction
or insufficient time, included in this operation is sating
of all unexpended ordnance.
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All other experiments must be shut down and safed and
pressures vented.
• Bacterial cultures must be safed and secured.
GO 2 and GN 2 pressure bottles must be vented. The ESRO
Spacelab design currentIy provides a nonpropulsive vent on
the forward bulkhead of the Spacelab for venting into the
cargo bay. Since the first abort opportunity is at Solid
Rocket Booster (SRB)burnout (,_,140, 000 ft), Oz/N Z vented
into the cargo bay would be dispersed to space through the
vent ports.
Miscellaneous equipment, tools, and flight articles should
be secured and the Orbiter sealed off from the Spacelab
prior to power removal.
3. i.4 Normal Landing at a Contingency Site
This is a general-type contingency situation where the Spacelab
cargo is Orbiter constrained, and to adequately handle the cargo, atten-
tion must be concentrated on the Orbiter requirements first. The
decision to land at a contingency site may or may not be a result of a
prior mission abort. The contingency flow" deveioped for landing at a
contingency site was for the worst case. It was assumed that the site
was not prearranged for an Orbiter landing and had no special support
equipment and no special trained maintenance personnel for the post-
landing tasks. It was further assumed that as much Orbiter safing as
possible will be performed with the types of equipment that can be
brought to the contingency site. Another assumption made to establish
this contingency was that a special equipped carrier plane such as a
Boeing 747 would bring the required support equipment to the site and
aIso return with it and the Orbiter to KSC. It was also assumed that
the Spacelab film, recorded data, and microbiological cultures could
be removed at the contingency site if it were considered imperative.
3. 1.4. 1 Time Line
The normal landing at a contingency site flow is shown in
Figure 8. The time required to safe and prepare the Orbiter and payload
for transport to KSC depends upon the distance and time of arrival of
personnel and equipment. The time line for this contingency is shown
in Figure 9.
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3. i. 4. Z Safing Requirements
Safing requirements for the Spacelab are performed in
flight.
3.1.5 Crash/Shock Condition Landin_ at KSC
Crash/shock condition landing is a hard or rough landing with
the potential of producing landing gear damages, hazardous leakages,
etc., that could ultimately result in a critical or catastrophic condition.
The precautions to be taken are similar to those required for aircraft
forced to make an emergency landing. Rescue personnel and fire
suppressant equipment should be ready on the landing strip in case of
fire. Of primary concern in this contingency is crew evacuation. After
crew evacuation, an inspection is made of the Orbiter's landing gear
to determine its ability to be towed off the landing strip and to the OPF.
3. I. 5. I Time Line
The crash/shock landing at KSC contingency flow is shown
in Figure i0. The time required from landing to transport to the OPF
is indefinite based on the condition of the Orbiter and leakage of pro-
pellants or hazardous fluids. The time line is shown on Figure Ii.
3. I. 5. 2 Safing Requirements
Safing requirements for the Spacelab are performed in flight.
3.1.6 Crash/Shock Condition Landing at a Contingency Site
The same basic assumptions that applied for landing at a
contingency site and crash/shock condition landing at KSC are also appli-
cable for this contingency. This contingency plan allows for a waiting
period if severe leakages were sustained prior to continuing with the
safing activities. This is an indeterminate time period and, depending
upon the severity of the leakages and the type of materials, may require
a different sequence of events.
3. 1.6. 1 Time Line
The crash/shock condition landing at a contingency site
flow is shown in Figure 1Z. The time required from landing
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to transport to t<iSC depends upon the distance and time to arrival of
personnel and equipment. The time line for this contingency is shown
in Figure 13.
3. 1. 6. 2 Sating Requirements
Sating requirements for the Spacelab are performed in
flight.
3. Z TUG/SEPS/SEOS CARGO CONTINGENCY PLANS
3.2.1 Backout Operations
This contingency is a general flow applicable to any Tug
cargo and makes no unique payload requirements, tt is
assumed that the reason for the backout is controlled. If a specific pay-
load or cargo related cause were to be identified that required a fix or
remedial action as a prerequisite to backout safety, it could be in-
corporated into this general flow. The operational steps required for
this contingency are shown in Figure 14.
3. 2. 1. 1 Time Line
The time line for the Tug/SEPS/SEOS backout operation is
shown in Figure 15. The time required for sating and removal of the
payload from initiation of contingency operations to return to SAEF #1
(TPF) is approximately 34 hr.
3.2. 1. Z Sating Requirements
The following is a sum._..ary of constraints and sating require-
ments that must be performed during the backout operations.
Drain and purge Tug LH2, fuel cell H2, and External
Tank (ET) LH 2 through Orbiter umbilicals.
Drain and purge Tug LOX, fuel cell O2, and ET LOX
through Orbiter umbilicals.
• Vent Tug LOX and LH 2 pressurants.
Vent Orbiter Reaction Control Subsystem (RCS), Orbital
Maneuvering System {OMS), and Accessory Power Unit
(APU) pressurants; drain PSRD propellants.
Z9
.-_
•-" °
<
z
<
<
z
Z
5
,..1
<
,..t
m
,g
vC9
A
li
f_
v
0
Z
o
<
M
0
0
0
a2
I
--1
I
i
I
I
J
N
La
S
69
Z
o
M
0
0
U
0
t/l
#
t_
I
Ii
0
ii
__.,,-n
o
m
m_
m
m
m
o _z
a_
_ d
va
,-1
al
2
,Y
o _
o
,¢
i,)
o
ul
'_TELEDYNE
BROWN ENGINEERING,
m
Connect service lines and vent Tug, SEPS, and SEOS
APS pressurants; vent SEPS Main Propulsion System
(MPS) pressurants.
Verify that no hazardous gases are present in the cargo
bay. The variety of hazardous materials (LH2, LOX,
hydrazine, mercury) indicates the need for a hazardous
gas analyzer in the cargo bay (at the pad).
Verify checklist of cargo control,and warning system
and remove payload power.
Separation of the SEOS or the SEPS/SEOS requires
safing of separation ordnance and installation of
shorting plugs. This operation requires access from
the PCR to all cargo pyrotechnic initiating devices
and may severely impact the payload design. The same
access is required for attaching the changed out payloads
to the Tug or the Tug/SEPS.
3. Z.2 Vertical Chan_eout at the Pad
This contingency covers the sating of the Shuttle and cargo
and addresses three options:
Assumes a malfunction or accident, etc. , has occurred
requiring that the SEOS be changed ottt.
,
• Shows a changeout of the SEPS/SEOS assembly.
Examines the option of changing out the entire Tug/SEPS/
SEOS cargo.
The last option did not consider the requirement of the payload change-
out room having the capability of handling two cargoes simultaneously
because this problem was addressed in the IUS/F2PU/PJP cargo.
The operational steps required for this contingency operation
are shown in Figure 16. This vertical changeout contingency is initiated
prior to servicing disconnect. If this contingency is initiated later in
the processing flow, a reconnect of the Orbiter and payload service
umbilicals would be required, The pad is cleared during propellant
drain operations.
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3. 2. Z. 1 Time Line
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The time line for the Tug/SEPS/SEOS vertical changeout con-
tingency is shown in Figure 17. If the SEOS payload is changed out,
the time from initiation of the contingency operation to return to normal
processing is approximately 32 hr. If the SEPS/SEOS payloads are
changed out together, the time from initiation of the contingency opera-
tion to return to normal processing is approximately 32 hr. If the
Tug/SEPS/SEOS cargo is changed out, the time from initiation of the
contingency operation to launch of a new cargo is approximately
80 hr.
The time lines for changeout of the SEOS only and the SEPS/
SEOS assume that the new payloads are at the pad when the contingency
operations are initiated. The time line for changeout of the Tug/SEPS/
SEOS cargo requires retraction and extension of the Payload Changeout
Room (PCR) twice.
3. 2. 2. Z Sating Requirements
Sating requirements for the Tug/SEPS/SEOS vertical changeout
contingency are identical to those for the Tug/SEPS/SEOS backout operations
except that the pyrotechnics need not be removed but only safed and shorting
plugs installed.
3.2.3 Mission Abort
The mission abort contingency plan for the Tug/SEPS/SEOS
cargo is shown in Figure 18. The majority of the operational steps
called out are monitoring and control functions of the Tug. The required
operations for a mission abort of this cargo need further definition and
additional study. A summary of the findings of this contingency analysis
is as follows:
Q
A rough cut analysis of the cargo weights when only Tug
LOX and LH Z are dumped indicate that the cargo center
of gravity is within the Shuttle envelope requirements and
total weight requirements for landing. _fherefore, Mer-
cury dumping is not required because of weight and cargo
center of gravity limitations.
Since this cargo is attached to the Shuttle by the Tug
only, the cantilever effects on the Tug structure and
adapter attach points at landing should be evaluated
to take into account the momentum shift of the 3000 lb
of mercury.
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Dump the Mercury if the momentum shift of the 3000 lb
of Mercury has not been taken into account.
If the design is such that in-flight dumping is not required,
Mercury tanks should remain pressurized or be pres-
surized to the operating level to assist in maintaining the
Mercury tank bladder integrity. Design of the tanks in an
"upside down" configuration would relieve stress on the
tank bladders at landing but would subject the bladders to
liftoff "g" loads. The design of the mercury tanks should
minimize the ullage volume.
A study should be performed to determine the effect of a
mercury cloud/dispersion on the atmosphere and ecology.
Alternate methods of dumping, optimum particle droplet
size, and time for dumping should be further studied
az the development of the SEPS kick stage progresses.
3. Z. 3. I Time Line
'A nominal time line for the mission abort contingency opera-
tions is shown in Figure 19. The dumping of mercury is shown as an
option with no time specified.
3. Z. 3. Z Sating Requirement
Sating requirements shown in the contingency flow include:
Tug LOX and LH 2 tanks are dumped out through
the T-O umbilical, purged, and partially repressurized
for landing. The Tug LI-IZ tank is vented and purged at the
landing strip (normal operation).
From a Shuttle safety standpoint, it is desirable to dump
the mercury propellant. However, the effects of this
action need to be determined as to the effect on the
ecology.
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All SEPS and SEOS pressurants (APS and MPS) should
be vented and Tug fuel cell Oz/H 2 bottles vented but still
maintain a positive pressure.
3. Z. 4 Normal Landing at a Contingency Site
Due to Orbiter constraints, very little can be done to the
Tug cargo for this contingency plan. The decision to land at a contingency
site may or may not be a result of a prior mission abort. If landing
at a contingency site had been preceded by a mission abort, then the
Lox and LH g would have been dumped, the tanks purged, as well as
the multilayer insulation purged, just as during a normal flight.
3. 2. 4. 1 Time Line
The normal landing at a contingency site flow is
shown in Figure Z0. The time required to safe and prepare the Orbiter
and payload for transport to KSC depends upon the distance and time to
arrival of maintenance personnel and support equipment. The time line
for this contingency is shown in Figure 21.
3. Z. 4. 2 Safing Requirements
The following constraints and Tug safing requirements for
normal landing at a contingency site are:
• Monitor cargo caution and warning functions.
• Vent hydrogen.
Additional helium purge of propellant tanks and
Multilayer Insulation (MLI).
These Tug safing requirements are performed in conjunction with the
following Orbiter activitie s:
• Perform Safety Verification
• Deactivate and secure Orbiter.
• Shut Off Auxiliary Power Unit.
• Install Mobile Ground Purge Unit.
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After mobile ground power for status display and cooling has been
connected, the following operations are performed while cargo
monitoring is continued:
• Fuel cells shut down and vented.
• High pressure gases are vented.
• NH 3 OMS and APU exhaust manifold are vented and purged.
• Modules are deserviced.
3. Z. 5 Crash/Shock Condition Landing at KSC
Crash/shock condition landing is a hard or rough landing with
the potential of producing landing gear damages, hazardous leakages, etc.,
that could ultimately result in a critical or catastrophic condition. With
the exception of landing gear damages, the most hazardous damage
would primarily be internal and may not be detected through the caution
and warning system until they had progressed to a potentially critical
or catastrophic condition. Once the crash/shock condition has been
sustained, the crew's safety is paramount and crew evacuation would
be the immediate requirement.
3. Z. 5. 1 Time Line
The crash/shock condition landing at KSC contingency flow
is shown in Figure ZZ. The time required from landing to transfer to
the OPF is an indefinite time frame and is based upon the following:
• Condition of the Orbiter
• Leakage of propellants or hazardous fluids.
The time line for this contingency plan is shown in Figure 23.
3. 2. 5. 2 Safing Requirements
Safing requirements for this contingency plan are primarily
Orbiter related. Prior to Orbiter cabin reentry, safing activities
consist of the following actions and precautions:
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• Evacuate crew
• Use fire suppressants where applicable
• Perform preliminary Orbiter inspection
• Inspect and monitor for hazardous materials leaks.
After reentry to the Orbiter, the following operations are performed while
the cargo is monitored:
Ensure that all Orbiter and payload systems have been
deactivated and secured.
• Perform Orbiter safety verification.
• Ensure that auxiliary power is off.
• Vent Tug main propellant tanks
• Helium purge Tu__ propellant tanks and MLI.
3.2.6 Crash/Shock Condition Landing at Contingency Site
This contingency differs from the crash/shock condition
landing at IKSC in a very important aspect--a landing at a contingency site
imposes a new set of constraints on the Orbiter and cargo. The equip-
ment required to perform a rudimentary level of safing is not available
at the contingency site and must be flown in; the time element involved
presents a hazard to the Orbiter and cargo. Also, any damages sus-
tained may not be as accurately assessed and treated as they should be,
thus compounding the inherent hazard associated with transporting the
cargo back to KSC.
3. g. 6. I Time Line
The crash/shock condition landing at a contingency site flow
is shown in Figure Z4. The time required from landing to transport to
KSC depends upon the distance of the contingency site from KSC and,
hence the time to arrival of personnel and essential equipment. The
time line for this contingency plan is shown in Figure Z5.
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3.2.6.2 Sating Requirements
The following Tug sating requirements are:
• Vent Tug main propellant tanks
• Helium purge Tug propellant tanks and MLI.
3.3 IUS/F2PU/PJP CARGO CONTINGENCY PLANS
3.3.1 Backout Operations at the Pad
The backout operations for the IUS/F2PU/PJP cargo, like
the normal processing of this cargo, present a number of unique situa-
tions and hazards. Two of these hazards and their impact are:
The RTG's on the PJP payload present a radiological
hazard that requires that the number of personnel and
access to the cargo be limited. The RTG's also present
a high temperature hazard if cooling is lost while in the
cargo bay. A significant temperature rise in the cargo
bay could adversely affect the thermal balance of the
liquid fluorine oxidizer on the F2PU. Loss of RTG
cooling is covered in Paragraph 3.4.
The design concept of the liquid fluorine oxidizer system
on the FgPU payload is a blowdown type where the internal
pressure is maintained by internal cooling supplied by an
external LN 2 supply. Venting or boiloff of the LF 2 tank is
an emergency procedure only. However, a vent and
fluorine disposal systekln must be provided at the pad in
case of a fluorine leak or overpressurization of the LF 2
tank.
If the backout contingency is initiated by a malfunction of the liquid
fluorine oxidizer system, provisions for pressure reliel, venting, and
draining of the LF Z system must be available at the pad. The design of the
pad vent system and fluorine oxidizer system should allow gas and liquid
to be drained, if the integrity of the fluorine oxidizer system is sound,
draining at the pad is not recommended. This recommendation is based
on the requirement that the loaded LF 2 tank pressure be maintained at a
low pressure {small positive pressurel until released from the Orbiter
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in space. Processing and launch of a LF 2 tank near operating pressure
(250-350 psi) should be avoided since this is in direct violation of Shuttle
safety guidelines and exposes ground personnel and the Orbiter to a
hazard with potential catastrophic effects.
The operations required to perform the general backout con-
tingency for the IUS/F2PU/PJP cargo are shown on Figure 26. This
contingency is not initiated by a malfunction of the liquid fluorine oxidizer
system. After Orbiter and IUS sating, the major concern for this
contingency is maintaining the fluorine cooling, exposure to RTG
radiation, and pyrotechnic devices. In the plan for this contingency, a
portable LN 2 servicer cooling system is connected to the fluorine
propulsion unit in the PCR.
if the handling of an LN 2 servicer in the PCR and in the
canister or in conjunction with the canister appear too unwieldy,
rather than connect the fluorine stage to an LN 2 servicer at the point
shown in the alternative flow {within PCR), it may be possible to
reconnect after the canister has been installed on the transporter.
TRW estimates, based on a preliminary LF 2 tank configuration, that
the tank pressure will remain within an acceptable value up to 6 hr
after its cooling medium is disconnected.
3. 3. i. i Time Line
The time line and sequence of operations required to perform
the backout contingency are shown in Figure 27. The time from
initiating the backout contingency to arrival at SAEF #1 with the cargo
is approximately 42 hr. Propellant dumping for the cargo and
Orbiter are performed sequentially to reduce the possibility of a fire
hazard from leakage of reactants. The pad is closed when the con-
tingency is initiated.
3. 3. 1. Z Sating Requirements
The following summary of the constraints and safing
requirements that must be performed during the backout contingency is:
• Drain and purge IUS N204 and lines.
• Drain and purge IUS and FzPU hydrazine tank and lines.
• Vent IUS tank pressurizing systems.
5Z
=i!
()
Ji
L
iLL
_L
q_
i!
it,
1..,
kl
o
,.-1
a_ _..
z ,q
<
0
0
,<
_u
,3
f,.
-- am=
L .....
I
ri
i
]
rr-
L
I
T
J
N
b_
S
u_
Z
b_
0
O
2
,d
t_
M
r,
fR I
i
=
m
D
m w
z
z
o
o
0
o
N
"P_TELEDYNE
BROWN ENGINEERING
Unload ET LOX and LH Z tanks and purge.
Open pad.
The payload NzO. and NzH. servicing units described
in Volume 3 should provide for draining, purgLng,
and drying of the propellant tanks and safe disposal
of the propellant effluents.
Connect payload service lines and vent FzPU, PJP, and
IUS APS pressurants.
Before the doors are opened, the absence of hazardous/
toxic gases should be verified. A hazardous gas
analyzer system that would determine the presence
of all gases is desirable.
Alter access to the cargo bay is attained via the PCR, two
basic approaches are available. The first is to remove the cargo as
quickly as possible, safe ordnance devices, and remove RTG's at
SAEF #1. This requires RTG cooling during transport in addition
to the fluorine cooling. The preferred approach, as shown in the
contingency flow, is as follows:
• Disconnect and short Class A Explosives (EED's}.
• Remove RTG's.
• Disconnect cargo umbilicals from the Orbiter.
• Remove payload.
This approach limits, as much as practical, the interaction
of potential hazards and limits the number of personnel exposed to the
various hazards.
3. 3. 2 Vertical Chan_eout at the Pad
This contingency plan is inherently complex because of the
hazardous materials used in the payload comprising the cargo and is
further complicated by the various options that were considered in
dealing with the payload changeout combinations. Four options were
developed as part of this contingency plan:
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• Changeout of the PJP only,
• Changeout of the F2PU/PJP.
Changeout of the IUS/FzPU/PJP cargo with the PCR
capable of handling one cargo at a time.
Changeout of the IUS/FzPU/PJP cargo with the PCR
capable of handling two cargoes at a time,
The operations required to perform these four contingency
operations are shown in Figure 28. This figure shows the operations,
common to all four options, required to safe the Shuttle and payload before
access is gained to the payload bay through the payload changeout room,
and the operations required for the four vertical changeout options.
3. 3. 2..I Time Line
The time line and sequence of operations for the four change-
out options are given below.
3. 3. 2. I. i Changeout of PJP Only
This contingency operation requires that the RTG's be removed
from the original PJP and installed on the new PJPunit. Also, the RTG's
cooling system has to be removed prior to the changeout of the PJP's
and reinstalled afterwards.
The time line and sequence of operations required to perform
changeout of the PJP payload are shown in Figure Z9. The time required
from initiation of this contingency to return to normal operations at
Shuttle and payload propellants loading is approximately 36 hr.
3. 3. 2. I. 2.Changeout of FzPU and PJP
In this option,the FzPU/PJP assembly would be changed out
for an identical unit. In addition to the RTG's cooling problem dis-
cussed in the first option, an even more critical problem is associated
with the cooling requirements for the F2PU.
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This unit requires a special LN 2 servicer to accompany the fluorine
stage throughout the operations until it is connected to the cargo's
fluorine refrigeration system. The mobile LN Z servicer is then
connected to the fluorine stage of the FzPU/PJP that was just changed
out, prior to its transfer back to the F Z loading facility for safing and
deservicing. The time line and sequence of operations required to
perform this changeout are shown in Figure 29. The time required
from initiation of this contingency to return to normal operations at
Shuttle and payload propellants loading is approximately 36 hr.
3. 3. Z. 1.3 Changeout of the Entire IUS/FzPU/PJPwith One Cargo
at a Time in the PCR
In this option,the assumption is made that an entire cargo
of identical composition will be exchanged for the original. It is
further assumed that the IRTG's will be taken off the first cargo and
installed on the new. As in the previous option, RTG's cooling and
the fluorine stage cooling are the big problems. The time line and
sequence of operations required to perform this changeout are shown
in Figure 30. The time from initiation of the contingency operation to
launch of a new cargo is approximately 73 hr.
3. 3. Z. 1.4 Changeout of the Entire IUS/FzPU/PJP with the PCR
Capable of Handling Two Cargoes
In the final option to this contingency, the same as sumptionz
were made as in option three, with the additional requirement that the
PCR accommodate two cargoes at the same time. This option requires
only one extension and retraction of the PCR, whereas in option three
two extensions and retractions were required. The largest impact will
be on the design of the PCR. It will require two cargo holding structures
to be added to the PCR and possibly a more capable payload manipulator
with added degrees of freedom. From a hazard point of view, the fluorine,
hydrazine, and other hazardous materials concentrations will be com-
pounded by having two cargoes in the PCR simultaneously. Also, the
original cargo that was removed from the Orbiter will have to remain
in the PCR throughout launch or a holdup of four additional hours will
be required to remove the original cargo from the PCR and pad area
prior to launch. The time line and sequence of operations required
to perform this contingency operation are shown in Figure 31. The
time from initiation of the contingency operation to launch of a new
cargo is approximately 64 hr.
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3. 3. 2. 2 Sating Requirements
The sating requirements for vertical changeout of the
IUS/FzPU/PJP are similar to those for backout operations discussed
in Paragraph 3. 3. 1. The major steps in the preferred sequence are:
• Remotely safe Shuttle and payload by draining propellants
and venting pressures (except for LF2).
• Verify no toxic/hazardous gases present in the cargo
bay before entering.
• Safe all ordnance (with shorting plugs).
• Remove RTG's.
• Remove cargo/payloads.
3.3.3 Mission Abort
In this contingency our primary concern is with the cargo
and its safing. Since the abort can take place at various points in the
mission, cargo related sating must be examined for the worst case.
Abort situations of concern are the inability to deploy the cargo (payload bay
doors will not open or cargo will not deploy or separate) and failure to
attain orbit. The worst case abort for any cargo based on time available
for safing is abort at SRB separation. However, for this mission abort
from orbit is of concern because this cargo carries onboard a limited
supply of cooling water for the PJP RTG's and a limited supply of LN z
for the fluorinated oxidizer system.
The operational flow for the in-flight safing activities for the
cargo are shown in Figure 3Z.
3. 3. 3. 1 Time Line
The mission abort contingency flow through landing is shown
in Figure 33.
3. 3. 3. 2 Safing Requirements
The following recommended safing requirements for in-flight
mission abort of this cargo are:
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Dump out IUS N204 and N2H 4 through the Orbiter
vent system and repressurize the tanks to a
positive pressure for landing.
Dump FzPU MPS hydrazine through the Orbiter vent
system and rePressurize the tank to a positive
pressure for landing.
Vent IUS, F2PU , and PJP APU pressurants over-
board through the Orbiter vent system.
• Monitor payload caution and warning parameters.
The requirements for dumping of the LF itank in-flight are
being considered in other NASA studies. Even though the fluorine stage
probably presents the largest hazard upon landing, no overboard fluorine
dumping was shown in the mission abort plan because fluorine is highly
reactive and a special fluorine dump system would be required; the
environmental impact of such an action has not been assessed; and as
long as the fluorine system is stabilized and controlled, the hazards
may be less in this state than in the dump mode. However, fluorine
dump provisions should be provided for in-flight venting in the event
that the fluorine system becomes uncontrollable.
3. 3. 3. 3 IUS/FzPU/PJP Contingency Special Support Equipment
3. 3. 3. 3. 1 RTG Cooling
The nominal post-landing Orbiter time line shows that 19 hr
is required from landing until access is gained to the payload in
the OPF. With only 15 hr of water supply onboard this cargo for
cooling the RTG's, provisions must be made at the landing site for
R TG cooling. It is recommended that this requirement be fulfilled
with a mobile water cooling servicer since an abort landing may
require additional time at the landing site.
3. 3. 3. 3.2 Fluorine Oxidizer Tank Cooling
An abort landing of the IUS/FzPU/PJP cargo requires that
special consideration be given to the fluorine oxidizer whether in-flight
dumping is performed or the LF z tank is returned intact. Because
there are presently no provisions for handling fluorine in the OPF, the
following options are available:
7Z
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a,.
b.
Provide onboard LN Z cooling supply or portable LN 2
dewar at the landing site to maintain tank thermal/pres-
sure balance until the FzPU can be removed from the
Orbiter, demated, and transported to the fluorine
facility. This would require, under normal operations,
a minimum of 19hr and exposes the Orbiter, OPF
facility, and operating personnel to the fluorine hazard.
Contingency operations resulting in an abort landing
could require additional time.
Vent and dispose of the fluorine at the landing strip.
This action requires a portable fluorine disposal unit
(charcoal burner), portable vent lines for connecting
the Orbiter fluorine vent to the fluorine disposal unit,
a heated GN z mobile servicer to be connected to the
LF Z tank ground cooling umbilical to boil off the LF Z,
and a GN Z supply to purge the LF Z tank. Previous
studies report that boiloff time for similar fluorine
upper stage concepts using the heated GN Z method
would require approximately 6 hr.
The final recommendation as to the handling of the fluorine
oxidizer in the event of an intact abort depends largely on whether in-
flight dumping is required or allowed. The effects on the environment
and ecology of dumping fluorine into near space should be studied.
Dumping in-flight would reduce the time required at the landing strip to
vent residual LF Z and allow the post landing operations to proceed
without the 6-hr delay required by option b. Another possible design
impact resulting from an abort with a fluorinated oxidizer system is
that provisions must be made for such an emergency to be able to drain
in the horizontal position.
3.4 ACCIDENT CONTINGENCY--LOSS OF RTG COOLING FOR
THE PJP ON THE IUS/FzPU/PJP CARGO
This is an accident-type contingency situation where the
undesired event is loss of RTG cooling after installation in the payload
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bay. The normal processing flow developed for this cargo (Volume 3)
established RTG installation at the pad at 14 hr before lift-off. The
RTG's are cooled by a ground water supply through the T-0 umbilical
until just before lift-off when the onboard supply is activited. The
onboard cooling water supply has tentatively been established for
1 5 hr of cooling.
3.4.1 Contingency Remedial Options
Upon detection of the RTG cooling water system malfunction
on the ground, two basic options are available. In the first option, the
malfunctioned cooling system must be shut down and safed followed by
backout operations. The second option also requires that the cooling
system be shut down and safed. If the decision is to proceed with normal
operations rather than backout, then either the entire RTG cooling unit
can be replaced or if less time is required, the unit could be repaired.
These options are shown in the following diagram:
DETECTION
OF RTG
COO L_G WATER
SYSTEM
MAL_" UNCTION
SHUTDOWN [.J_
A_D SAtE Im,Co._
MALrUNCTtONED{"-
COOLING SYSTEKI{ ]
OPTI_
OPTION I
R EPLAC E
RTG
COOLING
SYSTEM
REPAIR
RTG
COOLING
SYSTEM
_I l PROCEED WITH
BACKOUT
OPER ATIONS
PROCEED WITH
NORMAL
OP ER AT IO NS
The effect of the RTG's loss of cooling is overheating in the Orbiter
bay. Probably the highest potential impacts are on the RTG unit and
the fluorine stage, with the possible release of radiation and loss of
control of the delicate fluorine heat/pressure balance. The worst
case condition for this failure would require approximately 18 hr.
of Shuttle and cargo safing from initiation of a contingency until
access to the payload bay is attained via the PCR (Figure 27).
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3. 4. 2 RTG Coolin_ System Definition
To establish the fundamental safing operations for this con-
tingency, a likely candidate cooling system for the RTG's was devised.
The basic requirements for this system are shown in Figure 34. Such
a system must have, as a minimum, the following:
• On-pad water supply
• Pump
• RTG cooling water jackets
• Overboard dump valve
• Water boiler and heat exchanger
• RTG jacket water valve
• Boiler feed valve
• Water storage tank onboard Orbiter
• Pressure and temperature sensors in water cooling
loop
3. 4. 3 Contingency Failure Modes and Effects
This contingency can be brought into effect during ground
operations by any one of the following:
• Loss of on-pad water supply
• Rupture of RTG cooling jackets, lines, or fittings
• Overboard dump valve fails to water boiler position.
Except for rupture of the RTG cooling water jackets or lines, a transfer
to the onboard supply would provide cooling until the backout contingency
through removal of RTG's could be completed.
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After transfer to the onboard cooling supply, this contingency
can be brought into effect by any one of the following failures:
• Rupture or leakage of RTG cooling water jackets or lines
• Pump failure
• Boiler rupture or leakage
• Rupture of heat exchanger
• Failure of overboard dump valve to open to dump or to
boiler
• Failure of boiler feed valve to open to boiler or to
cooling loop
• Rupture or leakage of water storage tank
• Failure of RTG jacket water valve to open when requ, red
• Malfunctioning or false reading of pressure and/or
temperature indicators to the C&W system.
With the exception of failure of the overboard dump valve and rupture
or leakage of RTG cooling water jackets and lines, a transfer back to
the on pad water supply can provide cooling until the backout contingency
allows removal or repair of the RTG cooling systems. As a minimum,
the following redundancy provisions should be included in the cooling
system design:
• Pipe on-pad water supply to the RTG jackets independ-
ent of the on-board supply.
• Provide redundant overboard dump valve
Also, the integrity of the RTG coolant jackets and system should
be verified by a pressure/leak test prior to installation of the RTG's.
3.4.4 Fault Isolation--Loss of RTG Cooling
The contingency action required depends upon which failure/
malfunction occurs. Several of the component malfunctions will require
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the same actions. The detection of this contingency type requires a
temperature measurement either on the RTG case, in the cooling loop
or both. Therefore, heat sensors, monitorable through the C&W
system, are required, if an overheating condition is detected but with
no pressure loss in the cooling loop, then the probable source of trouble
is with a leak or rupture of the water boiler or storage tank. Since it
would require an elaborate monitoring and control system to fault isolate
every major component in the cooling system, a more practical solution
is to make some worst case assumptions as to the faulty items and
proceed with the shutdown and safing of the cooling water system, if
there is a rupture of the boiler, the action required is to shut off water
from entering the boiler. Because there is no way to drain, or more
rapidly deplete it, the boiler must be allowed to exhaust itself as vapor
and through leakage until empty, if there is a leak or rupture of the
water storage tank, the procedure would be to deplete the tank, by way
of the overboard dump, as rapidly as possible to minimize water leak-
ages on the cargo and in the Orbiter bay. If the pressure indicator
within the cooling loop has indicated a pressure loss, the malfunction
is either a pump failure, or a rupture of the cooling water jackets or
heat exchanger, which would require a shutoff of water to and draining
of water from the cooling loop.
3.4.5 Contingency Flow Plan
After the remote operations on the RTG cooling water system
have been completed, basic backout operations are initiated. When the
Orbiter bay doors have been opened, the RTG cooling water system can
be inspected and a decision made as to whether to continue the backout
operations or to repair/replace and proceed with the normal processing.
The operational requirements for this contingency are shown in Figures 35
and 36.
3.5 SPECIAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
Special support equipment is unique equipment recognized as
essentialfor the successful application of the contingency plans. These
items have not been previously called for in the normal processing plans
and thus are peculiar to their respective contingency situations.
For each cargo, a listing of special support equipment for
each contingency plan is provided. Sixteen items of support equipment
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or facility modifications have been recognized as a result of the con-
tingency plans. The essential requirements for each item are provided
on the Support Equipment Identification sheets. The title, basic function,
and description of each item are shown on the sheets designated C-I
through C- 16.
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SPECIAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT PER CONTINGENCY PLAN
CARGO IDENTIFICATION SPACE LAB/AT L
CONTINGENCY PLAN
I. Vertical Changeout At The PAD
2. Bac _u_ Operations
3. M_is: .on Abort
4. Normal Landing At Contingency Site
, Crash/Shock Condition Landing
At KSC
, Crash/Shock Condition Landing
At Contingency Site
SPECIAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
C-I Orbiter Bay Vertical Access
Mechanism and Work Platform
C-I Orbiter Bay Vertical Access
Mechanism and Work Platform
NONE
C-Z
C-3
C-4
C-5
C-6
Interior Access Assembly
Mobile Power Generator
Portable Orbiter Hoisting Device
Orbiter Strongback
Piggyback Carrier Aircraft
C-2 Interior Access Assembly
C-3 Mobile Power Generator
C-3
C-4
C-5
C-6
Mobile Power Generator
Portable Orbiter Hoisting Device
Orbiter Strongback
Piggyback Carrier Aircraft
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SPECIAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT PER CONTINGENCY PLAN
CARGO IDENTIFICATION TUG/SEPS/SEOS
CONTINGENCY
I •
•
PLAN
Vertical Changeout At The PAD
Backout Operations
3. Mission Abort
•
•
•
Nermal Lamdlmg At Comtingemcy Site
Crash/Shock Condition Landing
SPECIAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
C-1 OrbiterBay Vertical Access
Mechanism and Work Platform
C-I Orbiter Bay Vertical Access
Mechanism and Work _latform
NONE
C-3
C-4
C-5
C-6
Mobile Power Generator
Portable Orbiter Hoisting Device
Orbiter Strongback
Piggyback Carrier Aircraft
C-3 Mobile Power Generator
At KSC
Crash/Shock Condition Landing
At Contingency Site
C-3
C-4
C-5
C-6
Mobile Power Generator
Portable Orbiter Hoisting Device
Orbiter Strongback
Piggyback Carrier Aircraft
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SPECIAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT PER CONTINGENCY PLAN
CARGO IDENTIFICATION
CONTINGENCY PLAN
I. Vertical Changeout At The PAD
2. "Backo,. Operations
3. Mission Abort
1 Accident Contingency -
Loss of RTG's Cooling
IUS/F2PU/PJP
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SPECIAL
i i ii
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
i i i I
i
C-1
C-?.
C-8
C-9
C-IO
C-11
C-12
C-13
Orbiter Bay Vert. Access Mech.
RTG Handling Ring
RTG Handling Ring Sling
R TG Support York
RTG Handling Dolly
RTG Handling Rod
PCR Cargo Handling Fixtures
Modified Payload Manipulator
i| i ii
C-14 Mobile H20 Cooling Unit
C-15 Hot GN z Servicer
C-16 Portable LN z Supply and Transfer
Kit
v-1-25 Fluorine Vent System
SAME AS ITEM 2.
C-1 Orbiter Bay Vert. Access Mech.
C-7 RTG Handling Ring
C-8 RTG Handling Ring Sling
C-9 RTG Support Yoke
C-10 RTG Handling Dolly
C-11 RTG Handling Rod
C-IZ PCR Cargo Handling Fixtures
C-13 Modified Payload Manipulator
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT LISTING
UNIT/CATEGORY
Special Support Equipment Required For Contingency Planning
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT :
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Orbiter'Bay Vertical Access Mechanism And Work Platform
Interior Access Assembly
Interior Access Assembly ( Alternate )
Mobile Power Generator
Portable Orbiter Hoisting Device
Orbiter Strongback
Piggyback Carrier Aircraft
RTG Handling Ring
RTG Handling Ring Sling
RTG Support Yoke
RTG Handling Dolly
RTG Handling Rod
Payload Changeout Room Cargo Handling Fixtures
Modified Payload Manipulator
LIST NUMBER
C
1
2
2a
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
I0
ii
12
13
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
TITLE:
ORBITER BAY VERTICAL ACCESS MECHANISM AND
WORK PLATFORM
ITEM NUMBER:
C-I
FUNCTION:
The function of this structure is to provide maintenance personnel and technicians
an access to the cargo and cargo bay when the Orbiter is in the vertical position
at the PAD.
DESCRIP _ ON:
This
moun
later
with
shah
_it shall be an integral part of the PCR or otherwise be substantially
:d to it. It shall be capable of vertical and horizontal movement and
n_otion by mea.ns of a telescoping boom. The unit shall be provided
oucket or basket attached to the boom to hold personnel. The controls
,e operable from the bucket by the maintenance personnel.
EXPERIMENT [-_
A llJl{_ LL_
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
TITLE :
INTERIOR ACCESS ASSEMBLY
ITEM NUMBER:
C-2
FUNCTION :
The function of this item is to provide supported capability to enter or leave the
Spacelab through the Spacelab Crew Transfer Tunnel or segments of the tunnel
while in the horizontal configuration under 1 g conditions.
DESCRIPTION :
The interior access assembly will consist of folding metal platforms waich will
attach to the IVA handrails in the tunnel to provide a crawl platform fo- ingress/
egress. The platform segments will be designed for ease of installation with the
tunnel either installed or not installed in the Orbiter. Their length will be
compatible with all possible tunnel configurations.
EXPERIMENT
I
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
TITLE:
INTERIOR ACCESS ASSEMBLY (ALTERNATE)
, i,
ITEM NUMBER:
C-Za
FUNCTION:
The function of this item is to provide supported capability to enter or leave the
Spacelab through the Spacelab Crew Transfer Tunnel or segments of the tunnel
while in the horizontal configuration under 1 g conditions.
DESCRIPTI' :
The Int -1or Access Assembly will be designed to provide a flat surface inside
the Tun ,-: for personnel access into the tunnel. The assembly will be contoured
to the c =" ature of the tunnel to distribute the personnel weight and prevent damage
to the i? e ior surface. The access assembly will be designed in length to
accom_ ,date either a tunnel segment or an assembled tunnel.
EXPERIMENT [--_ FACILITY _--] STE _ GSE _--]
A I I I I LWn',_l f,_ _,_'1
SUPPORT
TITLE :
EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
MOBILE POWER GENERATOR
ITEM NUMBER:
C-3
FUNCTION :
The function of this unit is to provide power to certain critical instrumentation
for status display.
DESCRIPTION:
This power generator system shall have compatible connectors to mate vith
Orbiter connectors. The unit must have the capability of providing pow r to
certain instrumentations for monitoring of critical parameters.
Access to boat tail of Orbiter for hookup could be provided by ladders
via fire truck.
EXPERIMENT r-_
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SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
TITLE:
PORTABLE ORBITER HOISTING DEVICE
FUNCTION:
ITEM NUMBER:
C-4
The function of this unit is to lift the Orbiter from the landing strip, translate,
ar_t position it onto a carrier aircrafts piggyback holding structure.
DESCRIPT1 _: "
This e_ ipment shall have hoisting capability greater than 200,000 lb and be
capabh _f sufficient lat_ ral movement to achieve the above described function.
It shall lso be designeci for rapid assembly and disassembly. When disassembled,
_ta:h21 _ en;::k2g2d for stowage and shipment in the Orbiter's carrier aircraft's
The sketch illustrates a guy derrick as one possible arrangement of such
a mobile structure. /0
/
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SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
TITLE:
ORBITER STRONGBACK
ITEM NUMBER:
C-5
FUNCTION :
The function of this structure is to support the Orbiter at the forward and aft load
beam attach points so that the Orbiter can be hoisted while in the horizontal mode.
DESCRIPTION :
This unit shall be attached at four load points.
be a sling arrangement.
It may be a rigid structur or could
Za41(]
i
I=582 Xo1307
EXPERIMENT _3 FACILITY _]
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SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTI FICATION
TITLE:
PIGGYBACK CARRIER AIRCRAFT
FUNCTION:
ITEM NU_ER:
C-6
The function of this aircraft is to ferry the Orbiter from an alternate site to KSC.
DESCRIF ON:
This
lb. _
COnV_
two p
Both
• rrier aircraft shall be capable of carrying a gross weight in excess of 200,00C
_e.aircraft sho_:d be a Boeing 747 or similar aircraft capable of being
t,d. Modificat ons must consist of truss-work to distribute the weight of the
g. _ack load po,nts throughout the aircraft's basic load bearing structure.
,re and aft locations where the Orbiter's attachments will be mounted shall
be c_ npatible with the Orbiter's ET attachment points.
EXPERIMENT _-] FACILITY _-] STE [_ GSE _-]
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SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
TITLE:
RTG HANDLING RING
ITEM NUMBER:
C-7
FUNCTION :
The RTG handling ring procides a means of handling a pair of connected RTG's
from the center of the pair. It is used during most handling operations.
DESCRIPTION:
The RTG handling ring shall be hexagonally shaped and composed of rect, ngular
aluminum tubing. Three quick disconnect fittings on the ing frame shal_ match
holes on the delta frame structure. Trunnion shafts on the ring shall int, rface
with bearing brackets on the RTG Support Yoke. Attachment brackets sh_ll be
provided at the ends of the trunnion shafts for connection of a RTG Handling Ring
Sling.
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SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
TITLE:
RTG HANDLING RING SLING
ITEM NUMBER:
C-8
FUNCTION :
The function of the RTG handling ring sling when used in conjunction with overhead
cranes and a handling ring is to handle a pair of connected RTG's.
DESCR l
Th_
eac.
on t
ver_
?ION :
,llng shall con st of a straight beam with a wire rope cable suspended from
e_,d. Fork en, ; on the cables shall be compatible with attachment brackets
!,andling rin G These brackets shall allow the RTG's to be rotated from a
:a- to horizont ! atlitude while suspended from the sling.
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SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
TITLE:
RTG SUPPORT YOKE
ITEM NUMBER:
C-9
FUNCTION :
The function of the RTG support yoke (when used in conjunction with a handling
ring) is to support a pair of connected RTG's.
DE SCRIPTION :
RTG support yoke is a "V" shaped structure mounted on a t tbular post that
supported in a socket that is attached to a base plate. The ',TG's are capa,le
of being rotated in the yoke and locked in position.
See Support Equipment Identification item number C-7 for sketch of RTG
Support Yoke.
EXPERIMENT FACILITY _ STE _ GSE _-_
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SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
TITLE:
RTG HANDLING DOLLY
FUNCTION:
ITEM NUMBER:
C-10
The function of the RTG handling dolly is to provide mobile support for a pair
of RTG's while they are mounted in an RTG Support Yoke.
DESCRI} [ON:
This -em shall consist of
on ru her tread cast_ rs 8
contr Lled by a remo, able
to ma ch the vertical _ost
RTG'
for t
a steel platform approximately 30 by 36 in. , mounted
to 10 in. in diameter. It shall be manually
handle. A socket shall be provided on the platform
on the yoke. With the vertical post removed, the
mounted on th, delta frame-bipod assembly are bolted to the dolly bed
nsportation.
i
56.0
"%
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SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
TITLE:
RTG HANDLING ROD
ITEM NUMBER:
C-II
FUNCTION :
RTG Handling Rod is used to hold a pair of RTG's in a horizontal position while
the pair is passed through the fairings and mated to the PJP spacecraft.
DESCRIPTION:
RTG
(V,EW
!
!
EXPERIMENT [_ FACILITY D
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SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
TITLE:
PCR CARGO HANDLING FIXTURES;',,
ITEM NUMBER:
C -12
FUNCTION:
The function of the handling fixture is to hold a cargo in the vertical position
in the PCR.
DESCRIPI }i :
Two
part
for ",!
shall
fron
carg
rgo handling fix ures should be built into or otherwise made an integral
the PCR. One )f these units shall hold a secondary cargo to be exchanged
primary cargo in the event the latter is to be removed. The other unit
01d the first cargo during the exchange transaction required to remove it
ne Orbiter Bay and to install the second. These fixtures shall hold the
by installing it to the cargo flight attachment points in the same mode as
in the Orbiter Bay.
;:-"Required only if vertical changeout at the PAD is to be accomplished by having
the PCR accommodate two cargoes simultaneously.
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SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
TITLE :
MODIFIED PAY LOAD MANIPULATOR _-_
ITEM NUMBER:
C-13
FUNCTION :
To hold, handle, move, and position a cargo in the PCR.
DESCRIPTION:
The modified payload manipulator, in addition to the moven_ent in and out oi the
Orbiter bay, shall also have the capability of a side to side movement. The
manipulator shall be able to attach to and pick up a cargo in the Orbiter Ba",
back out into the PCR, turn 90°,and move the cargo into aPCR cargo handliag
fixture. This process shall also be reversible.
_:_Required only if the vertical changeout at the PAD is to be ac'complished by
having the PCR accommodate two cargoes simultaneously.
EXPERIMENT _-] FACILITY _--_ STE [_ GSE _]
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SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTI FI CATION
TITLE:
MOBILE HzO COOLING UNIT
ITEM NUMBER:
C-14
FUNCTION :
The function of the Mobile HzO Cooling Unit is to provide cooling water to the
RTG's Cooling System.
DESCRI! ION;
This
hose
capa •
or p
_obile cooling u it shall consist of a tank trailer assembly with compatible
onnections to th _ Orbiter/cargo interface with pump and flow regulation
lities. The uni could be towed by an attachment to the Orbiter tow vehicle
ered by a separate tow truck that would be driven along with the Orbiter.
EXPERIMENT _-] FACILITY [--_ STE _'_ GSE D
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
TITLE:
HOT GN Z
SERVICER
ITEM NUMBER:
C-15
FUNCTION:
The function of this unit is to provide heated GN 2
the boil off of gaseous fluorine.
to the IUS LF 2 tank to accelerate
DESCRIPTION:
The unit shall include a mobile tank with heating capability that can be conn :cted
to the portable GN Z supply and transfer kit. It shall consis of appropriate
transfer lines for interfacing with the GN 2 supply and the Orbiter/cargo. I. shall
include temperature indicators and controls and flow indicators.
EXPERIMENT _-_
1fl2
I
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
TITLE:
PORTABLE LN Z SUPPLY AND TRANSFER KIT
ITEM NUMBER:
C-16
FUNCTION :
The function of this kit is to provide means of transporting, connecting to
Orbiter, and transferring LN Z to pressurize and/or purge tanks and lines.
DESCRI: ION:
The i_ shall include a mobile tank, transfer lines,
inte_ _.e connections, flow indicators, etc.
control valve s, sensors,
EXPERIMENT _-_ FACILITY D STE
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3.6 FACILITY PROTECTION AND PERSONNEL SAFETY
In most cases, contingency processing plans require
inherently more hazardous operational sequences than do the normal
processing plans. The contingency plan is used in extreme emergency
conditions (an accident or schedule failure) when the normal processing
plan is, of necessity, temporarily abandoned. Therefore, a contingency
plan requires emergency action under stress conditions that are not con-
ducive to good safety practices but where such practices are needed the
most. Every effort has been made to provide the safest plan for each
contingency situation that is also the least time consuming. Safing
requirements for each contingency flow have been identified in previous
sections of this report.
In the description of the special support equipment, human
factors, personnel safety, and facility protection were considered and
called out as required. Even though contingency plans often require
more risky operations than normal processing plans, the same pre-
cautions and prudent actions by personnel should be exercised, such as
the use of personal protective gear and clothing and the following of
safe operational practices.
Volume 5 provides six sections devoted to a:pplicable opera-
tional safety criteria:
• RTG Operational Safety Criteria .... Section 3. 2.2
Electrical Operational Safety
Criteria .............. Section 3.2.4
Pyrotechnic and Solid Propellant
Motors Operational Safety Criteria. Section 3. 2. 6
@ Liquid/Gas Propulsion and Auxiliary
Propulsion Equipment Operational Safety
Criteria .............. Section 3. Z. 8
Toxic Fluids/Gases Operational Safety
Criteria .............. Section 3. Z. 9
General Safety Criteria Applicable to
Payloads .............. Section 3. 3
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The safety criteria contained in Volume 5 is the result of the
synthesis of applicable safety requirements, guidelines, and criteria
extracted from such documents as Kennedy Space Center Safety Practices
Handbook, Shuttle Payload Ground Operations Safety Handbook, e,tc. ,
and tempered with the findings of this study. These criteria should be
given consideration in any safety tradeoffs invoiving hazardous con-
tingency plan operations.
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